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plained, will generally weigh heavily against the party in the minds of
the jury. But it does not seem that a party's adverse testimony should
be automatically considered conclusive. The many qualifications rec-
ognized by courts applying the rule-of-conclusiveness are adequate in-
dications of the weakness of the rule itself. The continued use of a
rule that is encompassed by so many qualifications can only produce
protracted litigation, as losing parties seek appellate rulings on
whether a particular admission was or was not within a recognized
exception to the rule. The earlier approach, treating a party's adverse
statements the same as those of any other witness, seems to provide a
more flexible and desirable method of dealing with a party's adverse
testimony. It is to be hoped that more courts will pursue the course
indicated by the court in the principal case and reject the rule-of-
conclusiveness, for "The truth of the case depends on a comparison of
what all the witnesses say and all the circumstances indicate.'27
TORTS-GUEST STATUTE-STATUS OF RIDER LEGALLY OBLIGATED
TO PAY FOR TRANSPORTATION
In re Dikeman's Estate, 178 Kan. 188, 284 P.2d 622 (1905)
Plaintiff and defendant's decedent agreed that plaintiff would ride
in decedent's car and pay a reasonable sum for transportation to and
from a fraternal meeting. The amount to be paid was to be deter-
mined after the return home. On the return trip decedent's car col-
lided with a train, causing decedent's death and injury to the plaintiff.
Plaintiff sued decedent's estate, alleging ordinary negligence, and the
trial court sustained the defendant's demurrer. The Kansas Supreme
Court, three justices dissenting, affirmed the judgment of the trial
court, holding that plaintiff was within the Kansas "guest" statute
and, therefore, was precluded from recovery on the basis of ordinary
negligence.1
At common law the driver of an automobile has a duty to exercise
ordinary and reasonable care for the protection of a guest.2 Since
27. 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2594a n.16 (3d ed. 1940). For an extensive review
of the cases on the subject, see Annot., 169 A.L.R. 798 (1947).
The courts in Missouri have followed the rule-of-conclusiveness in dealing with
a party's own adverse testimony. Smith v. Siercks, 277 S.W.2d 521 (Mo. 1955);
Steele v. Kansas City So. Ry., 265 Mo. 97, 175 S.W. 177 (1915). See also Moll-
man v. Pub. Serv. Co., 192 S.W.2d 618 (Mo. App. 1946) (refusing to recognize
exception to rule because testimony related to evidence in party's own special
knowledge). 9 WIGMDRE, EVIDENCE § 2594a (Supp. 1955) lists the many excep-
tions to the rule recognized by Missouri courts.
1. In 'e Dikeman's Estate, 178 Kan. 188, 284 P.2d 622 (1955).
2. PRossER, TORTS 451 (2d ed. 1955). Missouri by statute requires the operator
of a motor vehicle to "exercise the highest degree of care." Mo. REV. STAT. §
304.010 (1949). This standard of care represents the driver's duty to his guest.
Kaley v. Huntley, 333 Mo. 771, 63 S.W.2d 21 (1933).
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1927 a majority of the states have abrogated this common law duty
by the enactment of "guest" statutes, While these statutes vary in
terminology, in general they relieve the driver of any liability to a
guest except when the driver is guilty of gross negligence. The
Kansas statute provides:
That no person who is transported by the owner or operator of
a motor vehicle, as his guest, without payment for such trans-
portation, shall have a cause of action for damages against such
owner or operator for injury ... unless such injury ... resulted
from the gross and wanton negligence of the operator ... 6
The usual reasons advanced for the enactment of a guest statute
are twofold: (1) the common law rule is contrary to the layman's
concept of justice, i.e., a rider who receives the benefit of trans-
portation from the driver and confers no benefit in return should not
be permitted to recover damages for the driver's ordinary negligence;
and (2) such a statute will deter collusion between driver and guest
in suits against the driver's insurer.' However valid these reasons
may be,' and whatever weight is to be accorded them in applying a
particular statute to a specific factual situation.' the language of the
3: Ctnnecticut was the first state to enact a guest statute. CoNW. liar. GEN.
STAT. § 1628 (1930) (later repealed). The constitutionality of the Connecticut
statute was upheld in Silver v. Silver, 108 Conn. 371, 143 At. 240 (1928), afikd,
280 U$8. 117 (1929).
4. Missoturi does not have a guest statute. See note 2 supra. For a compilation
of the statutes of the twenty-sx states which do have guest statutes, see Note, I
WNt L.J. 225 n.2 (1949).
,, The statutoiy descriptions of the negligence required vary, eg. "gross and
wanton ncegligence," "willful and wanton misconduct," "intentional act, gross
negligence, reckless disregard of right," "intoxication or reckless operation." SeeHodges, Thc Atomobile Gtest Statufes, 12 Tuns L. Ruw. 303 nn.1-22 (1934).Statutic' which deprive a guest of any remedy have been held unconstitutional.
See Weber, CGuezt eateteo, 11 U, CIx. L. REv. 24, 29 (1937).
6,. K '. GN, STAT. § 8-122(b) (Supp. 1955).
7, Hodges, The Aetomobde Guest Statates, 12 TEXAS L. REv. 303 (1934);
Welter, GtCe S1atte, 1 U. CiN. L Ruy. 24, 84-35 (1937).
R, In the situation where the driver is insured it is quite likely that the lay-
man's concept of justice would permit the rider, especially if he were a friend or
member of the driver's family, to recover against the driver's insurer. It is also
questioabc whether the guest statute prevents collaboration by the driver andguest or merely requires collaboration on additional elements of proof i.e., the
relationship of the parties and the presence or absence of payment for the trans-
portation. As the insurance lobby was largely responsible for the passage of
these statutes it might be contended that this Justifies interpretations of the
,tatutfs favorable to insurers, thus requiring more plaintiffs to prove a degree of
misconduct higher than that of ordinary negligence. However, this reasoning
would appear to be inconsistent with legislation designed to compel car owners
to carry insurance, All of the states have enacted some form of financial respon-
sibility legislation. Netherton, Highway Safety Under Differ ng ' pes of Liability
Legi~~f 1o,, 15 OIo Sr. LJ. 110, 118 n.18 (1954). All but four o the states have
passed security-type safety responsibility laws which have been quite effective in
raising the percentageof those insured. Id. at 121; Vorys, A Short Survey ofb'au z Thigned to ,elctde the Financially Irresponsible Driver from the High-
wayf, 15 Ono ST. LT. 101, 102 & n.3 (1954). See also 1954 WAS=. U.L.Q. 244.
9 Weber, Guest Statutes, 11 U. CIN. L. Bm, 24, 35 (1937) :
The defects in the common law are associated with the gratuitous guestTh, guest whose presence in the vehicle is beneficial to the host is in a dif-
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1956/iss2/7
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
Kansas statute clearly contemplates"' three classes" of riders: (1)
nonguests; (2) guests who have given "payment" for the transporta-
tion; (3) guests who have not given "payment" for the transporta-
tion.12 If the rider is within the last class he must allege and prove
gross negligence; if he is within the first two classes, the common law
rules of liability for ordinary negligence are applicable.
Certain relationships between rider and driver negative a guest-
host status, 3 e.g., prospective vendor and vendee,14 employer and
employee,15 or teacher and student. 6 Of course, the transportation in
question must have been furnished in furtherance of this relation-
ship. 
7
ferent category. It does not seem to be unfair to require the operator to
exercise due care for his safety. The chances of collusion are definitely
lessened when the guest pays for his transportation or is a business as-
sociate of the host.
10. The rules of statutory interpretation are of little value in this area. Al-
though the guest statutes are in derogation of the common law and thus ap-
parently subject to the principle of strict construction, legislation should not be
so construed as to render it ineffective. Weber, Guest Statutes, 11 U. CIN. L. REV.
24, 33 (1937). The search for legislative intent in this area is also fruitless.
See note 8 supra.
11. See the text supported by note 6 supra. In construing the Iowa statutory
language of "as a guest or by invitation and not for hire" the Iowa Supreme
Court said:
It is evident that the intent of the legislature . . . was to recognize non-
gratuitous riders in an automobile, as well as a guest and a mere invitee
.... to distinguish between "passenger for hire," as that term is used in
law, and other nongratuitous riders in an automobile.
Knutson v. Lurie, 217 Iowa 192, 195-96, 251 N.W. 147, 149 (1933).
12. In the majority of the statutes the language used is "guests without pay-
ment." See note 4 supra. "Guest without giving compensation" is the language
used in the California and North Dakota acts. CAL. VEHICLE CODE § 403 (1948);
N.D. REV. CODE § 39-1501 (1943). For the suggestion that this language might
call for a different result in a particular case, see Phillips, When the Guest Buys
the Gas, 1949 INS. L.J. 407, 408 n.6. The language of the Nebraska and Montana
statutes is "guest or by invitation and not for hire." MONT. REV. CODES ANN.§ 32-1113 (1947); NEB. REV. STAT. § 39-740 (1952).
Another possible method of classification would be to distinguish only between
"guests" and "nonguests." However, this would overlook the presence of the
"without payment" language and would be too indefinite for a useful guide.
13. Smith v. Clute, 277 N.Y. 407, 14 N.E.2d 455 (1938); Phillips, When the
Guest Buys the Gas, 1949 INS. L.J. 407, 409; Weber, Guest Statutes, 11 U. CIN.
L. REV. 24, 35-39 (1937). Some courts treat these "nonguest" cases as "guests
who have made payment" situations since the driver usually receives some benefit
in furnishing transportation to the rider. See, e.g., Duncan v. Hutchinson, 139
Ohio St. 185, 39 N.E.2d 140 (1942).
14. Crawford v. Foster, 110 Cal. App. 81, 293 Pac. 841 (1930); Bookhart v.
Greenlease-Lied Motor Co., 215 Iowa 8, 244 N.W. 721 (1932). In several states
the prospective purchaser of an automobile is expressly excluded from the opera-
tion of the guest statute. See, e.g., IND. ANN. STAT. § 47-1022 (Burns 1952).
15. State Compensation Ins. Fund v. Dalton, 13 Cal. App. 2d 284, 56 P.2d 962(Cal. App. 1936); Kruy v. Smith, 108 Conn. 628, 144 Atl. 304 (1929); Garrett
v. Hammack, 162 Va. 42, 173 S.E. 535 (1934).
16. Whittecar v. Cheatham, 287 S.W.2d 578 (Ark. 1956). See also Smith v.
Clute, 277 N.Y. 407, 14 N.E.2d 455 (1938) (passenger for hire and chauffeur).
17. Kruy v. Smith, 108 Conn. 628, 144 AtI. 304 (1929); Labatte v. Lavallee,
258 Mass. 527, 155 N.E. 433 (1927).
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While not considered by the court in the principal case, 16 another
relationship which might, if found to exist,19 result in a nonguest
classification is that of joint enterprise. A joint enterprise exists
when the parties have a common purpose and a mutual right of con-
trol over the instrumentality used in effectuating that common pur-
pose.-" Joint enterprisers, on a rider-driver agency theory, may be
liable to third persons because of the negligence of any one of them,
or may be barred from recovery against a third person by reason of
such imputation of negligence.:
It is arguable that because of the substantial legal consequences
attaching to the finding of joint enterprise, it is unrealistic, in that
situation, to classify the rider in the vehicle as a "guest" within the
meaning of the guest-host statutes. But in the overwhelming ma-
jority of jurisdictions which have recognized the joint enterprise doc-
trine, no negligence is imputed in suits between joint enterprisers. 2 2
Consequently, it may be said that the finding of joint enterprise affects
the legal status of the parties only insofar as the rights and liabilities
of third persons are involved; inter se the joint enterprisers are still
guest and host. The bare finding, therefore, of a joint enterprise
should not place one of the parties in the nonguest classification.
Certainly it seems unnecessary to encumber guest-host statutes with
a judicial doctrine which, at least in its modern extensions, is based
on a compounding of the fiction of a mutual right of control with the
fiction of a rider-driver agency.2 4
18. In Bedenbender v. Walls, 177 Kan. 531, 539, 280 P.2d 630, 636 (1955), how-
+o.r, the Kansas court that the joint enterprise doctrine had no bearing on
the application of the guest statute.
19. An agreement to share expenses of a trip is some evidence of the mutual
right of control that is necessary to establish a joint enterprise. PROSSER, TORTS
:166 (2(1 ed. 1955).
20 In a minority of jurisdictions the existence of a common purpose in which
the driver and rider have a mutual interest is sufficient to establish a joint enter-
prise. 1J. at 364.
21. IJ. at '363-64.
22. The joint enterprise doctrine of vicarious liability is for the protection of
third persons against the hazards of the enterprise and is not applicable in ac-
tions between the parties to the undertaking. Thus, in the majority of states
the driver's negligence will not be imputed to the rider to bar an action by the
rider avainst the driver. Id. at 366-67.
22. In discussing the relation of the doctrine of joint adventure to the Wash-
ington guest statute, Richards, Another Decade Under the Guest Statute, 24
WASH. L. RF1v. 101, 121 (1949), said:
[S]o long as it is on the books it [the guest statute] should not be stultified
by first bringing in as an escape from it a concept totally foreign in field
and purpose and then watering that concept down in its application to social
expeditions until the statute had ceased ... to have much of any meaning
at all.
24. PROSSEn, TORTS 367 (2d ed. 1955). The Supreme Court of Idaho in French
v. Tebben, 53 Idaho 701, 713, 27 P.2d 474, 479 (1933), stated that if the rider
and driver were engaged in a joint enterprise or adventure the gross negligence
requirement of the guest statute would not be applicable. The case is cited with
apparent approval in Weber, Guest Statutes, 11 U. CIN. L. REv. 24, 39 & n.35
(1937). In Washington, parties engaged in a joint adventure are not within
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1956/iss2/7
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The distinguishing factor in the second and third classifications is
the presence or absence of "payment"; it is only the non-paying guest
who must allege and prove gross negligence. 25 The payment require-
ment is satisfied if the rider confers a "benefit, '20 even though pros-
pectively,27 upon the driver.23 This may consist of assisting with the
driving,29 acting as a guide for the driver,30 or accompanying the
driver to make peace with the driver's wife.31 Nor is it necessary that
the benefit be conferred by the rider rather than by some third per-
son.2 Neither is it essential that prior to the actual trip the driver
or the rider be legally bound in a contractual sense to undertake the
trip.33 If, however, the trip is taken pursuant to a promise to make
payment, the rider is a paying guest. Although courts seek to explain
this by asking whether the benefit conferred, i.e., the payment, was the
"motivating cause" of the furnishing of the transportation,"4 it seems
that the real question in such cases is whether the payment has been
"bargained for."35 Stated succinctly, a gift is not payment--but a
the guest statute. See, e.g., Pence v. Berry, 13 Wash. 2d 564, 125 P.2d 645 (1942).
For a discussion of the early practice in that state of permitting the joint adven-
ture to be utilized as an easy escape from the guest statute and the later practice
of limiting this doctrine to the business partnership, see Richards, Another Dec-
ade Under the Guest Statute, 24 WASH. L. REv. 101, 110-21 (1949).
25. Notwithstanding the fact that the same factors that would create a joint
enterprise may be present in the paying guest classification, the proof of a joint
enterprise would be an unnecessary step in attempting to avoid the guest statute.
26. Hasbrook v. Wingate, 152 Ohio St. 50, 87 N.E.2d 87 (1949).
27. Kempin v. Mardis, 123 Ind. App. 546, 111 N.E.2d 77 (1953).
28. This, of course, does not mean that the rider must be a passenger for hire
in the legal sense. Smith v. Clute, 277 N.Y. 407, 14 N.E.2d 455 (1938).
29. Druzanich v. Griley, 19 Cal. 2d 439, 122 P.2d 53 (1942).
30. Arkansas Valley Co-op. Rural Electric Co. v. Elkins, 200 Ark. 883, 141
S.W.2d 538 (1940); Lerma v. Flores, 16 Cal. App. 2d 128, 60 P.2d 546 (1936);
Hansen v. Lawrence, 149 Neb. 26, 30 N.W.2d 63 (1947); Dorn v. Village of North
Olmsted, 133 Ohio St. 375, 14 N.E.2d 11 (1938).
31. Zaso v. De Cola, 72 Ohio App. 297, 51 N.E.2d 654 (1943).
32. Sprenger v. Braker, 71 Ohio App. 349, 49 N.E.2d 958 (1942).
33. Albrecht v. Safeway Stores, 159 Ore. 331, 340, 80 P.2d 62, 66 (1938). It
has been stated that in the "purchase of gasoline" cases there must be a binding
obligation to pay certain expenses to constitute "payment" for the transportation
and that the consideration must be adequate. Weber, Guest Statutes, 11 U. CIN.
L. Rav. 24, 39-40 (1937). However, it seems that if the transportation has been
bargained for this satisfies the payment requirement even though the contract to
pay expenses would not for some reason be binding upon the parties prior to the
trip. The adequate consideration requirement is urged because of the fear that
the statute would be circumvented by an agreement to pay a nominal amount.
It would seem, however, that if the transportation were in fact bargained for,
the amount to be paid would be more than nominal.
34. Ward v. Dwyer, 177 Kan. 212, 277 P.2d 644 (1954); Srajer v. Schwarts-
man, 164 Kan. 241, 188 P.2d 971 (1948); Vogrin v. Bigger, 159 Kan. 271, 154
P.2d 111 (1944) ; Bushouse v. Brom, 297 Mich. 616, 298 N.W. 303 (1941).
35. See Lerma v. Flores, 16 Cal. App. 2d 128, 60 P.2d 546 (1936); Phillips,
When the Guest Buys the Gas, 1949 INs. L.J. 407. Weber, Guest Statutes,
11 U. CiN. L. Ray. 24, 39 & n.37 (1937), suggests that the bargaining element
is not necessary except in the gasoline purchase cases. Of the cases cited to sup-
port this, only Russell v. Parlee, 115 Conn. 687, 163 Atl. 404 (1932), really dis-
cusses the question and there the court was faced with a nonguest situation.
Defendant's employee had hired the plaintiff to help him with work for the de-
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bargained for consideration is. Thus, mere gratuities of the road,
e.g., voluntary contributions to the expenses,3 are not payment within
the statutory sense.
In the principal case the transportation must have been bargained
for since the court assumed' that there was a legally enforceable con-
tract to pay for it. " Thus, under the principles set out above, the
rider would be a guest who had made "payment" and thus would not
be within the guest statute. However, the Kansas Supreme Court held
that the plaintiff was within the guest statute because the trip was of
a social nature. This reasoning is in accord with an earlier Kansas
case- and several other decisions,, which have ascertained whether
the rider was within the guest statute by determining whether the
trip was of a social or business nature, regardless of the fact that the
rider had conferred a benefit upon the driver. This seems to have re-
sulted from equating the words "social" and "guest" and overlooking
the presence of the word "payment" in the statute. Of course, the
social nature of the trip should be given appropriate weight in deter-
mining whether the transportation has been bargained for. But when
the parties have, as in the principal case, entered into a legally en-
forceable contract, the fact of a bargain is definitely established, and
the social aspects of the trip become immaterial. Thus, it would seem
that the result in the principal case cannot be logically supported.
fendant. On the day the accident occurred the defendant driver requested his
e.mployee t, ride in the car to defendant's farm. Plaintiff was present at the
time and aloo entered the car. The defendant knew that the plaintiff was going
to his farm to perform the work for which he had been hired by defendant's
emplove.
36. See, c.,., Riggs v. Roberts, 74 Idaho 473, 264 P.2d 698 (1953); Shumaker
v. Kline, :3'33 Mich. 346, 53 N.W.2d 295 (1952).
37. 1?, re Dikeman's Estate, 178 Kan. 188, 195, 284 P.2d 622, 628 (1955).
:8. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 75 (1932). This is not the type of situation
in which the promissory estoppel principle of § 90 is applicable.
3!9. In Bcdenbender v. Walls, 177 Kan. 531, 280 P.2d 630 (1955), the parties
had gone on many hunting trips together, some in plaintiff's automobile and some
in defendant's, under the agreement that the party who did not take his car
would pay for the gasoline and meals consumed. Such was the arrangement in
question and the Kansas Supreme Court held that the rider was within the guest
statute. However, the court did point out that upon the facts of the case the
payment of these expenses only amounted to an "exchange of social amenities."
40. See Vogrin v. Hedstrom, 220 F.2d 863 (8th Cir. 1955) (applying California
guest statute); Duncan v. Hutchinson, 139 Ohio St. 185, 39 N.E.2d 140 (1942).
The principal case, however, is apparently the first case to hold that a rider who
has entered into a legally enforceable contract is nevertheless within the guest
statute,
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